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CASH AND ACCRUAL METHODS OF INCOME TAX
ACCOUNTING
WILLIAM J. BOWE*
That the legal profession muffed the ball in the beginning days of the
federal income tax law is so widely recognized that laymen almost invariably
refer tax problems to their accountants. The lawyer is consulted, if at all, only
after the dispute has reached the litigation stage. This is largely due to the
attitude of the profession. Lawyers have shied away from tax matters. They
have hesitated to enter a field where the principles of accounting rather than
law seemed to be determinative. This reluctance runs counter to our long tra-
dition. The technical language of other fields of learning has not generally de-
terred the practitioner who needed an understanding of the principles of
some other science to win his case. This hesitancy in the tax field is without
justification. Every tax dispute involves a legal problem. The lawyer's tools-
the rules of evidence, of statutory construction, of governmental power, of
stare decisis; the techniques of settlement; the skills of presentation and argu-
ment; in short, the tools of the legal practitioner are in a large measure the
tools of the tax practitioner.
Accounting concepts and principles have long been part of the stock in
trade of the trust and estate lawyer, the corporate and business advisor, the
family investment counselor.' Among the most elementary of these concepts are
the cash and accrual methods of accounting. The general practitioner has shown
a strange reluctance to grapple with these terms. Yet as a result of the develop-
ing case law they have in the field of taxation more of a legal than an account-
ing flavor in that the policy considerations on which judicial decisions are
based have so shaped and altered their traditional meaning that to the non-
tax accountant they are, to put it mildly, distorted versions of the original
systems.
It is the purpose of this article to introduce the two methods of income
'tax accounting to the general practitioner who is not a specialist in the field
and to the student who is attempting to learn the subject of income taxation.
The article simply seeks to express in a clear and orderly fashion the developed
law on the topic.
REQUIREMTENT OF ANNUAL ACCOUNTING PERIOD
As a practical matter, income taxes must be collected on a periodic basis.
"It is obviously not feasible to wait until a man's death, then cast up his entire
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. They use accounting principles, for example, in dealing with the following:
amortization; expense vs. capital expenditures; repairs vs. improvements; income vs. re-
turn of capital; depreciation and depletion.
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lifetime, and collect an income tax on the net result."'2 Because of our system
of progressive rates, the year in which a particular receipt becomes taxable
or in which a particular deduction is allowed will vitally affect the amount of
the taxes payable. In Jackson v. Smietanka,3 the taxpayer served as railroad
receiver from May, 1913, to April, 1918. He had throughout this period been
paid for his services, pursuant to court order, $2000 per month. The order
fixing this monthly compensation provided that he "shall be at liberty to apply
for such further compensation as to the court may appear reasonable and
just." In 1918 he was allowed and paid "as final payment for all services ren-
dered by him during.the receivorship herein the additional sum of $100,000."
Had he been allowed to prorate this sum to the years earned, instead of having
it all taxed in the year of receipt, his tax liability would have been reduced by
$19,973. 4 In Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.,5 the taxpayer was engaged
from 1913 to 1916 in carrying out contracts with the United States for dredg-
ing the Delaware River. It included in gross income for each of these years
the payments received under the contract and deducted its expenses paid.
Expenses exceeded payments by $176,271.88. The corporation's tax returns
for 1913, 1915 and 1916 showed net losses. The return for 1914 showed no
net income. The company abandoned the work in 1915 and sued the United
Statea for breach of warranty as to the character of the material to be dredged.
It obtained in 1920 a recovery of $192,577.59, which included the $176,271.88
by which its expenses. exceeded its receipts. The Court of Appeals held that
the amount of $176,271.88 represented a return of losses suffered in the earlier
years and hence was not taxable as income. The Supreme Court in reversing
this decision said:
"Only by including these items of gross income in the 1920 return would it have
been possible to ascertain respondent's net income for the period covered by the return,
which is what the statute taxes. The excess of gross income over deductions did not
any the less constitute net income for the taxable period because respondent, in an
earlier period, suffered net losses in the conduct of its business which were in some
measure attributable to expenditures made to produce the net income of the later
period .... It is the essence of any system of taxation that it should produce revenue
ascertainable, and payable to the government, at regular intervals."'
2. GassWOLD, CASES ON FEDERAL TAXATioN 475 (2d ed. 1946).
3. 272 Fed. 970 (7th. Cir. 1921).
4. This harsh effect has been mitigated by legislative action; see INT. REV. CODE §
107. Similar remedial legislation has eliminated many of the unfortunate consequences re-
sulting from the requirement of an annual accounting period. See id. § 122 (net loss carry-
over and carry-back) ; id. § 42(b) (pertaining to non-interest bearing obligations issued
at a discount and providing an election as to the time of treating certain increment
thereon as income) ; id. § 44 (installment sales) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.42-4 (com-
pleted contract method) ; INT. REv. CODE §§ 42, 43 (income of decedents) ; id. § 117(e) (1)
(capital loss carry-over).
5. 282 U. S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 150, 75 L. Ed. 383 (1931).
6. 282 U. S. at 364.
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CASH AND ACCRUAL BASIS
Section 41 of the Internal.Revenue Code" provides that income shall be
computed in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed
by the taxpayer. Section 42 8 requires that cash-basis taxpayers shall report
items of gross income in the year actually received, and that accrual taxpayers
shall report such items in the year accrued. Section 43 9 provides the correl-
ative rules with respect to deductions. Cash-basis taxpayers are allowed ex-
pense deductions in the year actually paid; accrual taxpayers in the year the
liabilities are incurred or accrued. There is one very important exception ap-
plicable to both types of taxpayers. The above rules apply, "unless in order
to clearly reflect income, the deduction should be taken as of a different
period." 10
The cash basis is the in-and-out-of-pocket method. Income actually re-
ceived and expenses actually paid are reported. This system serves for or-
dinary non-business citizens and to some extent for professional men and the
proprietors of very small enterprises. But to reflect income fairly, a business
of any substantial size and complexity will find the accrual method a necessity.
Under this method income is reported when earned. Deductions are taken
when accrued." Thus, if a lawyer on the accrual basis completes a particular
assignment for a client and a fee is agreed upon in December, he reports that
item as income even though the fee may not be paid until the following year.
Similarly, rent for December and any other operating expenses incurred in
December will be deductible for that year even though these items are not
7. "The net income shall be computed upon the basis of the taxpayer's annual ac-
counting period (fiscal year or calendar year, as the case may be) in accordance with
the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer."
8. "The amount of all items of gross income shall be included in the gross income for
the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer, unless, under methods of accounting
permitted under section 41, any such amounts are to be properly accounted for as of
a different period."
9. "The deductions... shall be taken for the taxable year in which 'paid or accrued'
or 'paid or incurred,' dependent upon the method of accounting upon the basis of which
the net income is computed."
10. INT. REV. CODE § 43. See also id. § 41: "[I]f the method employed does not
clearly reflect the income, the computation shall be made in accordance with such method
as in the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income."
11. "The essential nature of the accrual basis ignores the collection or other receipt
of income and payment of deductions, but recognizes in lieu thereof the increase in the
taxpayer's net assets through the acquisition of rights to receive cash, accounts receivable
and other property of whatever nature, regardless of when collection or other receipt
occurs, and similarly recognizes decreases in net assets arising from obligations incurred
during the taxable year, whether or not actually paid or payable therein.
"The accrual method is preferable for the determination of income from business,
since almost any business must recognize in some form the existence of receivables and
payables. Consequently, most businesses of any considerable size determine income on
the accrual basis but there are still thousands of small businesses and some larger ones
which continue to use the cash basis and are permitted to do so under the terms of the
Code." 2 MONTGOMiERY, FEDERAL TAXES-CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS, 1948-49, p.
351.
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paid until the following year. Under this system earnings and the expenses
related to such earnings are better tied to the same period.
There are a number of departures from the traditional accounting princi-
ples. These have been developed by the case law (1) to prevent unfair dis-
tortion of income in a particular period, (2) to decrease tax avoiding oppor-
tunities, and (3) in response to a very basic practical principle that taxes should
be collected at a time when cash is in hand, even though such a rule may
violate some of the niceties of accounting science.
INCOmE-CAsH BASIS
(a) Constructive Receipt.
It was early recognized that a too strict adherence to the requirement of
actual receipt would enable taxpayers on a cash basis to select arbitrarily the
year in which particular items would be subjected to tax, and to do so to the
detriment of the public revenues. The savings account depositor would fail
to draw his interest in a year of high rates or of unusual earnings or returns on
his investments. Similarly the owners of corporate boAds would refrain from
presenting coupons for collection until a year when off-setting losses or other de-
ductions were available. To prevent this type of avoidance, the cash method was
pushed one step back from actual receipt. The courts held that it was enough
that the funds were unconditionally available-that the taxpayer could have
them for the asking.' 2 In the words of Mr. Justice Holmes, "The income that
is subject to a man's unfettered command and that he is free to enjoy at his own
option may be taxed to him as his income, whether he sees fit to enjoy it or
not." 13 But there must be no obstacles to collection.'
4
(b) Prepayments.
Items will be taxable as income in the year of receipt even though the tax-
payer may not have yet. earned the money and even though he may be under
a contingent liability to return a part or all of it. In Saunders v. Commissioner,15
officers of a building and loan'association charged and received commissions on
the sale of its capital stock. These were later returned on advice of counsel
after suit was instituted against the recipients. It was nevertheless held that
12. Hedrick v. Commissioner, 154 F. 2d 90 (2d Cir. 1946); Loose v. United States,
74 F. 2d 147 (8th Cir. 1934) ; Edward Mallinckrodt, Jr., 38 B. T. A. 960 (1938) ; U. S.
Treas. Reg. 111, §§ 29.42-2, 29.42-3. But the taxpayer may not blow hot and cold. Where
he fails to report such items in the year they become available he will be taxed on them
in the year of receipt. He will not be permitted to contend from behind the shelter of
the statute of limitations that the items were taxable in the earlier years. Moran v.
Commissioner, 67 F. 2d 601 (1st Cir. 1933).
13. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 378, 50 Sup. Ct. 336, 74 L. Ed. 916 (1930).
14. A corporation declared a dividend payable on December 31 and checks were
mailed to the stockholders on that date; a taxpayer who received his on January 2
was held taxable in the year the check was received. Avery v. Commissioner, 292 U. S.
210, 54 Sup. Ct. 674, 78 L. Ed. 1216 (1934).
15. 101 F. 2d 407 (10th Cir. 1939).
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"Revenue thus received under claim of right and without restriction as to use
and disposition constitutes taxable income, even though the person receiving it
may subsequently be adjudged liable to restore it or its equivalent."' 6
The problem of prepayment of income items arises most frequently in
connection with long term leases. If at time of the execution of the lease the
tenant pays the rent for both the first and last years, the landlord is required
to include both amounts in his gross income for the current year.17 It should
be noted that the harsh effect of this rule may be avoided if the amount attribu-
table to the last year's rent is accepted as a security deposit for the faithful per-
formance of the lease covenants.18
INcOmE-ACCRUAL BASIS
(a) Unliquidated Claims.
Generally an item is income to an accrual-basis taxpayer at the time his
right to the money becomes fixed and certain.1 9 It is not necessary that the
claim be liquidated so long as the existence of the liability is not in dispute. It
is enough that the amount of the claim may be estimated with reasonable ac-
curacy. For example, the Treasury has ruled even though the amount of the
liability is undetermined at that time, the proceeds to be received under a fire
insurance policy accrue as income in the year in which the fire occurs to a tax-
payer on the accrual basis, provided the liability is not contested by the insur-
ance company.2 0 The taxpayer is required to estimate the value of his unliq-
uidated claims. For this reason items of undeterminative value are not
includible in income.21
(b) Dividends.
The regulations and decisions have created exceptions to the general rule.
16. Id. at 409. See also South Dade Farms v. Commissioner, 138 F. 2d 818 (Sth Cir.
1943) ; Griffin v. Smith, 101 F. 2d 348 (7th Cir. 1938) cert. denied, 308 U. S. 561 (1939);
Baker v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 976 (Ct. Cl. 1937).
17. Astor Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F. 2d 47 (5th Cir. 1943).
18. Clinton Hotel Realty Corporation v. Commissioner, 128 F. 2d 968 (5th Cir. 1942).
19. That collectibility is doubtful will not excuse accrual of an item. See Spring
City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U. S. 182, 184-85, 54 Sup. Ct. 644, 78 L. Ed. 1200(1934), where the Court said: "Petitioner first contends that the debt, to the extent
that it was ascertained in 1920 to be worthless was not returnable as gross income in that
year, that is, apart from any question of deductions, it was not to be regarded as taxable
income at all. We see no merit in this contention. Keeping accounts and making returns
on the accrual basis, as distinguished from the cash basis, import that it is the right to
receive and not the actual receipt that determines the inclusion of the amount in gross
income. When the right to receive an amount becomes fixed, the right accrues. When a
merchandizing concern makes sales, its inventory is reduced and a claim for the purchase
price arises .... On an accrual basis, the 'total sales,' to which the regulation refers, are
manifestly the accounts receivable arising from the sales, and these accounts receivable,
less the cost of the goods sold, figure in the statement of gross income. If such accounts
receivable become uncollectible, in whole or part, the question is one of the deduction
which may be taken according to the applicable statute."
20. G. C. M. 14666, XIV-1 Cum BULL. 181.
21. 2 MONTGOmERY, FEDERAL TAXES-CoRPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS, 1948-49,
p. 360.
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The accrual-basis taxpayer becomes entitled to a dividend on stock owned by
him not later than the "record date" and conceivably as early as the "declaration
date." Yet actual receipt of the dividend is the event which incurs tax liability.
Any other rule would have unfortunate consequences in the administration of
the income tax statute. Assume the record date to be December, 1949, and the
payment date January, 1950. If an accrual-basis taxpayer sells in 1950 after
the record date to a cash-basis buyer, a contrary rule, while logically correct,
would impose two taxes on the same dividend.2 2 Also if a company which had
no accumulated earnings and profits, had a deficit in 1949, but had earnings in
1950, the distribution would be taxable as income to cash-basis recipients but
would be treated as return of capital rather than income for accrual-basis re-
cipients.23 A further difficulty is presented in cases where the distribution is of
property of fluctuating value. There the amount of the taxable dividend might
be substantially different depending on the method of accounting used by par-
ticular stockholders. These considerations led the courts with the aid of the
statutory definition of a divided as a corporate "distribution" 24 to hold that
the actual receipt of the dividend constitutes the taxable event, even in the
cases of those using the accrual method.2 5
(c) Prepayment.
Another and more important exception is found in the prepayment cases,
of which Brown v. Helverihig 26 is a typical example. The taxpayer was a
general agent for fire insurance companies and was entitled to receive over-
riding commissions on policies written by local agents. Many of these policies
were for periods of longer than one year, and if one was cancelled, the policy
holder became entitled to a refund. The taxpayer in turn was required to refund
to the insurer the corresponding portion of the commission he had received. He
had set up on his books an account entitled "Return commission." In it was
recorded his estimate, based on experience, of his liability to refund commissions
with respect to policies written during the year. The Supreme Court, sustaining
the Commissioner, held the entire amount received was net income, even though
the taxpayer would very probably have to refund a portion of it in a later year.
Thus under the accrual method, the year of actual receipt may be determinative.
Sound accrual accounting would treat such items as in suspense until earned,
but practical problems of tax collection dictate the wisdom of imposing the
tax when the funds are in hand.2"
22. The accrual taxpayer would include the dividend in his gross income for 1949; the
cash-basis buyer would have to report it as part of his gross income in 1950.
23. Tyler, When Does a Dividend Become Income? 80 J. ACCOUNTING 353 (1945).
24. INT. REV. CODE § 115.
25. Commissioner v. American Light and Traction Co., 156 F. 2d 398 (7th Cir.
1946).
26. 291 U. S. 193, 54 Sup. Ct. 356, 78 L. Ed. 725 (1934).
27. An automobile club on an accrual basis was held taxable for the entire amount
of membership fees received although they covered services for a period of three years




The same result has been reached in the prepayment cases where there
was a substantial dispute as to the right to the funds. In the Brooklyn Union
Gas case,28 the New York Public Service Commission issued orders in 1916
directing gas companies to reduce their rates. The companies attacked this
action in the courts and secured an interlocutory injunction staying execution
of the Commissioner's order and directing that moneys collected in excess of
the reduced rates be impounded subject to the order of the court. In 1919 the
court permitted the withdrawal of the impounded moneys by the companies
upon the giving of security for repayment if the reduced rates were sustained.
In 1922 the commission abrogated its original order reducing the rates. Thus
the first time that the right of the companies to the excess collected became fixed
and certain was in 1922. Prior to that date proper accounting would preclude
the accrual of a purely contingent asset. But the companies received the money
in 1919 without restriction on its use, and the court held it was taxable in that
year. The leading Supreme Court case is North American Oil Consolidated v.
Burnet.29 There a receiver was appointed to operate certain property pending
the outcome of a suit brought to contest the taxpayer's title thereto. Net income
produced from the receiver's operations of the property in 1916 was turned
over to the taxpayer in 1917, upon entry of a decree dismissing the bill. The
decree was appealed and the litigation determined finally in 1922. The taxpayer
contended that the profit should be allocated either to 1916 or 1922. But the
court said it was income in the year received, 1917. It was not income in 1916,
because the right was not then fixed or certain. It was not income in 1922 be-
cause it had been received without restriction in 1917. Thus the rule is well es-
tablished that such items are income in the year of accrual or receipt, which-
ever is earlier.30
The North American Oil and the Brooklyn Union cases, in so far as they
hold no accrual is permissible so long as the claim is disputed, are to be con-
trasted with the rule that mere uncertainty as to the amount of an admitted
claim does not delay accrual. Under the latter rule, income accrues as soon as
the claim is conceded. The taxpayer is required to make an estimate of the value
of the claim, subject to later correction. While these classifications may at
times shade into each other, the distinction between an unliquidated claim and a
Bureau has ruled that magazine subscriptions paid in advance are income when received,
though the magazines are to be furnished in future years. G. C. M. 20021, 1938-1 CuM.
BULL. 157.
28. Commissioner v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 62 F. 2d 505 (2d Cir. 1933).
29. 286 U. S. 417, 52 Sup. Ct. 613, 76 L. Ed. 1197 (1932).
30. There seems to be one exception to this prepayment rule. The regulations with re-
spect to the sale and purchase by a corporation of its bonds provide, "if subsequent to
February 21, 1913 bonds are issued by a corporation at a premium, the net amount of
such premium shall be prorated or amortized over the life of the bonds." U. S. Treas. Reg.
111, § 29.22(a)-17.
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The doctrine of constructive receipt under which the cash-basis method was
broadened to include items which though not actually received were unquali-
fiedly subject to the taxpayer's control has never been carried over to the de-
duction side of the tax ledger. Should wages be deducted by a cash-basis tax-
payer if in December cash is withdrawn from his bank account and placed in
the hands of a disbursing officer, but some employees fail to call for their pay
until the following year?31 In Vander Poel, Francis & Company v. Commis-
sioner,3 2 a corporation on a cash basis credited to the account of its officers
salaries earned. The funds were unconditionally available to the individuals and
on the theory of constructive receipt were included in their tax returns. The
corporation took a deduction on the theory of constructive payment. But the
Commissioner disallowed the item and his decision was sustained by the Tax
Court.
There is no correlative doctrine of constructive payment. The constructive-
receipt rule was developed to prevent taxpayers from exercising an unfettered
choice of the year in which they would actually collect (and hence incur the
tax) on income items. No such arbitrary power exists with respect to choosing
the year of a deduction. While creditors can readily persuade debtors to delay
payment until next year, the debtor is rarely successful in inducing his creditor
to permit him, the debtor, to select the year for payment.
The courts have been strict. Deductions are thought of as a matter of
legislative grace 33 and hence a rigid adherence to the letter of the statute has
been insisted upon. While this strictness may cause an occasional hardship, the
policy considerations behind the doctrine of constructive receipt are absent.
And the common sense and practical attitude of examining agents in avoiding
a too technical application of the rule requiring actual payment in cases where
the debtor inadvertently fails to cash the creditor's check, have made it workable.
On the other hand, a recognition "of a correlative rule of constructive payment
would in some cases enable the debtor to eat his cake and have it too. Situations
may readily be suggested where employers and other responsible debtors would
suggest to executive employees or friendly creditors that the funds were avail-
able and credited on the books, but that a year-end delay in withdrawal would
be helpful for credit or other 'reasons.
31. Hulse, Can the Cash Basis of Reporting Be Justified Now? 24 TAXES 139 (1946).
32. 8 T. C. 407 (1947).
33. Inter State Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U. S. 590, 63 Sup. Ct. 1279, 87
L. Ed. 1607 (1943).
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(b) Form of Transaction.
The form of the transaction will often be determinative of its tax conse-
quence. Had the officers in the Vander Poet case drawn their salaries and
loaned comparable amounts to the corporation, the deduction would undoubted-
ly have been allowed. Formal elements are frequently important in tax matters,
especially for the cash-basis man. A person borrowing $1,000 from his bank at
5 % interest for two years may sign a note for $1,000, while his account will be
credited with only $900. The bank deducts the interest in advance. This is tra-
ditional banking practice, and the mercantile understanding of this transaction
is that the debtor has prepaid $100 of interest. Similarly where a borrower re-
news a loan on his life insurance policy, the normal procedure is for him to
execute a new note to the company in an amount which includes interest to the
renewal date. Thus if he borrows $500 in January, 1949, and wants to borrow
an additional $300 in January, 1950, the company will have him sign a new
note for $800, cancel the $500 note and give him a check for $275-the remain-
ing $25 discharging his interest obligation on the $500 loan from January, 1949,
to January, 1950. Are these borrowers entitled to deductions for interest paid?
An analysis of these situations demonstrates that in neither case has the borrow-
er actually paid any interest. He has promised to pay but he has not paid. He
may never pay. Indeed, he has no obligation to pay until maturity of the note.
Factually, in the bank case, the bank loaned him $900 in return for his promise
to pay $1,000 at the end of the two-year period, the additional $100 being the
charge for the use of the money. The insurance loan transaction is identical.8 4
Had the bank actually credited the borrower's account with $1,000 and received
his check for $100, a deduction by the borrower for interest paid would have
been proper.3 5
(c) Prepayment.
While the cash-basis taxpayer has been allowed to deduct prepaid in-
terest,36 there is a definite trend toward requiring him to amortize all prepaid
items whenever the life of the asset or service purchased extends for a measur-
able period beyond the year of prepayment.3 7 Here again the objective is to limit
the taxpayer's uncontrolled power of selecting the year when the deduction will
be most profitable to him rather than putting it in the year where it will fairly
reflect his income. The most common example is the three-year prepayment of
fire insurance policies on business or rental property by cash-basis taxpayers.
Since the benefits of the contract are exactly equal in each of the years, a de-
duction of the expense attributable to future years in the current year brings
about a distortion of income. Even more important than the requirement that
34. Cleaver v. Commissioner, 158 F. 2d 342 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U. S.
849 (1947); Keith v. Commissioner, 139 F. 2d 596 (2d Cir. 1944).
35. Cf. Newton A. Burgess, 8 T. C. 47 (1947).
36. John D. Fackler, 39 B. T. A. 395 (1939).
37. Commissioner v. Boylston Market Ass'n, 131 F. 2d 966 (1st Cir. 1942).
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taxes be computed in accordance with the system of accounting regularly :m-
ployed by the taxpayer is the statutory command that a deduction be taken
during the period when it will most fairly reflect his income. This rule has been
applied to prepayment of rentals,38 bonuses for the acquisition of leases, 39
bonuses for the cancellation of leases 40 and commissions for negotiating
leases. 41 All of these expenses are required to be amortized over the life of
the lease. Query if the cases permitting full deduction in the year paid of prepaid
interest will long survive.
(d) Accounts Receivable and the Bad Debts Deduction.
One other problem should be noted before leaving the cash-basis taxpayer.
He may not deduct as a bad debt an uncollectible receivable. The accrual-basis
taxpayer on the other hand, deducts his loss in the year in which such debt
becomes worthless. This is permissible because he has included it in gross in-
come in the year of the sale or rendition of service and paid a tax thereon. It
thus becomes a capital asset. On the other hand, the cash-basis taxpayer has
never included it in taxable income; hence it has no cost basis to him and its
non-payment does not result in a recognized tax'loss.
DEDUCTIONs-AcCRUAL BASIS
(a) Ability to Pay.
The accrual-basis taxpayer 'becomes entitled to a deduction in the year
when the liability is incurred 42 or accrued.4 3 It is immaterial that he has not
discharged his obligation. Indeed, it has been held immaterial that there is no
reasonable prospect of his ever paying. In the Zimmerman Steel Company
case, 44 the Commissioner refused to allow the taxpayer deductions which it
claimed on account of interest accrued upon its debts. The Commissioner's
position was based on a finding that "there was no reasonable probability that
38. Baton Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 51 F. 2d 469 (3d Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284
U. S. 674 (1931); Galatoire Bros. v. Lines, 23 F. 2d 676 (5th Cir. 1928).
39. Home Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 65 F. 2d 532 (8th Cir. 1933); J. Alland &
Bro., Inc. v. United States, 28 F. 2d 792 (D. Mass. 1928).
40. Steele-Wedeles Co., 30 B. T. A. 841 (1934); Harriet B. Borland, 27 B. T. A.
538 (1933).
41. Bonwit Teller v. Commissioner, 53 F. 2d 381 (2d Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284
U. S. 690 (1932).
42. Section 24(c) of the Internal Revenue Code is a provision intended to prevent tax
avoidance. Under it expenses deductible under section 23(a) and interest deductible
under section 23(b) may not be deducted by an accrual-basis taxpayer, if all three of the
following conditions exist: (1) the expenses or interest are not actually paid in the tax-
able year or within two and one-half months after the end of the year, (2) the payee is
on a cash basis, and (3) the payor and the payee are closely related persons between
whom losses would be disallowed under section 24(b).
43. Where he prepays expenses attributable to later years, he must amortize the ex-
pense over the life of the asset. This is in accordance with sound accounting principles.
Indeed, as hs been noted, this accrual principle has been generally required of cash-basis
taxpayers.
44. Zimmerman Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 130 F. 2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1942).
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such interest would ever be paid." The Court of Appeals in reversing the
Commissioner, said:
"Though it is earnestly insisted for the government that the conclusion of the
Board was without error, it is admitted in the brief that 'there are no court decisions
directly holding that an accrued item of expense may not be deducted when there is
no reasonable expectancy that it will be paid.' Our own search has confirmed the ad-
mission. The law is that if a method of bookkeeping employed by a taxpayer 'does
not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall be made in accordance with such
method as in the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income' (Section
41), and the real facts, not forms of entry, must measure the tax. But where interest
actually accrues on a debt of a taxpayer in a tax year the statute plainly says he may
deduct it. That he has no intention or expectation of paying it, but must go into bank-
ruptey as this taxpayer was obliged to do, can not of itself justify denial of deduction
in computing the taxpayer's net income. It is true that if a man's gains at the end of
the year consist of bad debts he can have no net income to tax. But neither does he have
such net income if the interest on what he owes amounts to more than his gains.""
(b) Unliquidated Obligations.
A deduction accrues when all of the events which go to fix the liability
have occurred, even though the amount of the obligation may not have been
ascertained. In United States v. Anderson,46 the taxpayer was engaged in the
manufacture of munitions in 1916. The munitions tax on the profits from 1916
sales became due and was paid in 1917. The taxpayer deducted this amount
from its 1917 income. The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer's books were
kept on the accrual basis, and that the tax was deductible in 1916, not in 1917.
The Court said: "In a technical legal sense it may be argued that a tax does
not accrue until it has been assessed and becomes due; but it is also true that
in advance of the assessment of a tax, all the events may occur which fix the
amount of the tax and determine the liability of the taxpayer to pay it." 47
(c) Disputed Liability.
Here again on the deduction side of the ledger we have the distinction be-
tween an unliquidated claim and a disputed liability. In a leading case, Cahn
owned a jewelry business in California. In 1944 he sustained a loss from bur-
glary amounting to $34,000. He carried burglary insurance with Lloyd's of
London, but his insurers denied liability on the grounds that it was an "inside
job." In 1945 suit was brought against Lloyd's and a settlement made for $27,-
500. The court held the entire loss was deductible in 1944.48 Because of the
disputed liability, and therefore the non-accruability of his claim against his
insurers, Cahn's loss was not "compensated for by insurance." 49 The usual
disputed liability case is the one in which the accrual taxpayer contests the
45. Id. at 1011-12.
46. 269 U. S. 422, 46 Sup. Ct. 131, 70 L. Ed. 347 (1926).
47. 269 U. S. at 441. See also Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 375,
51 Sup. Ct. 144, 75 L. Ed. 397 (1931).
48. Cahn v. Commissioner, 92 F. 2d 674 (9th Cir. 1937).
49. Of course the $27,500 would be taxable as "recovery" income in 1945.
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existence of the obligation. He may not accrue an expense and at the same
time dispute its validity.
The Mississippi Taxing Authorities declared that a solvent used by the
Dixie Pine Products Company in its business was gasoline, within the meaning
of the state law defining gasoline and laying a tax on its receipt and use. Dixie
refused to pay and brought a suit to enjoin collection. At the same time it at-
tempted to accrue its liability for the tax. The deduction was disallowed on the
ground that the liability was "'contingent" and "contested." 50 Had Dixie paid
the tax and sued for refund, the deduction would have been allowed. 51
CONCLUSION
The cash-basis taxpayer is chargeable only with actual receipts, plus items
which are unconditionally available to him. Prepayments received for future
services are taxable in the year of receipt, even though there may be a con-
tingent liability to refund some or all of the money. Similarly payments received
under a claim of right, even though a liability to repay may later be judicially
enforced, constitute income in the year of receipt. He may deduct expenses ac-
tually paid, subject to the limitation that prepayments for items whose live's
extend beyond the year prepaid may have to be amortized. There is no doctrine
of constructive payment corresponding to the doctrine of constructive receipt.
Actual payment is necessary. Nothing short of this will satisfy the statutory
requirement. The form of the transaction may be decisive. This is particularly
true in the bank, insurance and brokerage loan cases, where the tax require-
ment that an interest check or cash be given is completely out of line with busi-
ness practice.
The accrual-basis taxpayer reports items in gross income in the year in
which the right arises, or in the year in which payment is received, whichever is
earlier. He must accrue a claim even though the amount be in dispute; he may
not accrue it if his right is contested. His right to a deduction arises as soon as
all the events have occurred which determine his obligation. That the amount is
uncertain is immaterial. He may deduct it even though there is little likelihood
of his being able actually to make payment. Where the liability is contested and
therefore the item is not properly accruable, he may nevertheless take a de-
duction if he actually makes the payment, even though he proposes to sue to-
get his money back.
The harsh effect upon the recipient, either on a cash or accrual basis, of
the prepayment rule may be avoided by tying strings to the receipts until the
fund is earned or the right to it established. The taxpayer may arrange to hold
50. Dixie Pine Products Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 516, 64 Sup. Ct. 364, 88
L. Ed. 270 (1944).
51. Chestnut Securities Co. v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 574 (Ct. 'C1. 1945);
Western Cartridge Co. 11 T. C. No. 37 (1948); G. C. M. 25298, 1947-2 CuM. BULL. 39.
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the money as a trust fund, as security for the contingent claim pending determi-
nation of his right, or as security for the payment of the services or property
when -earned.
The cash-basis system serves ideally for the average citizen (wage earner
or investor), who spends as he receives. The accrual method alone assures a
fair.picture of the activities of substantial business enterprise. But like the dis-
tinctions between day and night or youth and age, individual cases will frequent-
ly fail to fall clearly on one side of the dividing line or the other. In part this
explains the departures from traditional accounting concepts, but more itupor-
tant in shaping the rules has been the need under our system of progressive
rates and annual accounting periods to place limitations on the power of
individual taxpayers to control the time when a receipt shall be included in
gross income and when a deduction shall be taken. It should not be forgotten
that it is important that each citizen should bear his fair share of the tax burden.
To the extent that any substantial number of persons arrange their affairs so
as to reduce their burdens, the load on all other taxpayers is correspondingly
increased.
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